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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILFORD M. BURTON, Trustee,
Plaintiff a11d Respondent,
vs.

l'NITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Involuntary Plaintiff, Case No.
Respondent, and Defendant, . 12917
vs.

WILLARD ROGERS, ARLENE
ROGERS, his wife, 'VILLARD D.
HOGERS, JR.,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is by 'Vilford M. Burton, Trustee, and
the United States of America, seeking to quiet title to
the surface rights of property in Brighton, Salt Lake
County, Utah.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOYVER COURT
The Ho11orable Gordon R. Hall granted l<'inding
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts is not a fair state·
ment of facts under Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is incomplete, is not objective and for the
most part is merely an extended argument. The following is therefore submitted in lieu thereof.
The property is at Brighton, Salt Lake County and
consists of the surface to a tract of land 501.5 feet east
and west, and approximately 2,800 feet north and south,
covering the East portions of patented mining claims,
New York Extension 5945 A, Silver Lake No. 5 and
Alton. (R. 116, Ex. 17-P). The property includes a
portion of Silver Lake and is described by metes and
bounds beginning with the first deed (Ex. 5-P) and
continuing throughout the Chain of Title and all taxing
documents, down to the present time as follows:
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Sec·
tion 35, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt
Lake Meridian and running thence 'Vest 50Li
feet more or less to a point 8 rods 'Vest of the
extreme 'V estern boundary of Silver Lake;
thence South along a line passing through a point
8 rods 'Vest of the extreme '7\T estern boundary of
Silver Lake to a point due 'Vest of the Southwest comer of said section; thence due East to
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said Southwest corner of said section 35· thence
North to poiut of beginning.
'

Respondents' Chain of Title
The Chain of Title from U.S. Patent down to the
plaintiffs covering the surf ace rights to the property,
and described as above, is as follows:
Evergreen Mining
(a) U. S. Patent to the
and Tunnel Company, No. 200253, dated May
22, 1911 and recorded July 21, 1953. (R. 95,
Ex. 4-P)
( b) Quit Claim Deed from Old Evergreen Mining
and Tunnel Company, a corporation to James
H. Moyle, signed by Henry Cohn, president,
H. G. McMillan, secretary, dated November
22, 1911, and recorded July 11, 1944. (R. 96,
Ex. 5-P)
(c) Warranty Deed from James H. Moyle and
Alice C. Moyle to the Lakewood Farm, a corporation, dated July 8, 1944, and recorded
July 11, 1944. (R. 96, Ex. 6-P)
(d) 'Varranty Deed from the Lakewood Farm to
Wilford M. Burton, Trustee, dated December
1, 1955, and recorded December 16, 1955. (R.
102, Ex. 7-P). Said Deed was made as a part
of the Plan of Dissolution of the corporation,
as appears on the second page thereof.
(e) Correction 'Varranty Deed from the Lakewood Farm to 'Vilford M. Burton, Trustee,
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<lated December 19, 1955, aud recorded J unt
13, 1957. (R. 103, Ex. 8-P). Said Correction
does not modify the original description.
(f) Quit Claim Deed from Wilford M. llurto11 ,
Trustee, to the United States of America
dated June 12, 1969, and recorded June 12:
1969. Said Deed includes additional property.
(R. 104, Ex. 9-P)
(g) The U.S. Survey Plat No. 5945A is referrea
to iu the Patent and appears herein as Ex. IO·
P. (R. 104)
Additional facts relating to the plaintiffs' title to
the surface of the property are as follows:
(a) The Lakewood Farm Corporation was dis·
solved. Incident to this dissolution the stock·
holders executed an escrow agreement wherein
'Vilford M. Burton was named as Trustee.
(R. 124-127, 155, Ex. 18-P)
( b) The various stockholders in the Lakewood
Farm conveyed their respective interests in the
property to the United States Government.
(Ex. 39-D, pages 69-76)
( c) 'Vilford M. Burton, Trustee, as plaintiff
quieted title against Finn Z. Gurholt and
Greta Gurholt, his wife, Gordon W. Kirby
and Ruth J. Kirby, his wife, in a case filed
.January 2, 1963. The Decree was dated Feb·
ruary 5, 1963, and recorded on February 5.
1963. The Lis Pendens was duly recorded Jan·
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uary 2, 1963. (Exs. 12-P, 13-P). The Gurholts and Kirbys are predecessors in title to
any interest claimed by the def endants-appellants herein.
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Possession and
Non-Mining Use of Surface

For the last 50 to uO years the Moyle family has
used the premises. During this time, according to James
D. Moyle, son of James H. Moyle, the following use
was made of these properties:
(a) It was completely fenced and used as a pasture. (R. 113)
(b) After the pasturing ceased, a gate has been
maintained leading into and out of the property, to keep trespassers out. (R. 113)
(c) There was a hotel for many years, and in the
l930's a stable was placed on the property. (R.
113)
(d) The property was enclosed many years ago
with a three log fence. (R. 116, 117, Ex. 17P). After the fence deteriorated, access to the
entire area was controlled by a gate. (Ex. 17P, "H", R. 117). Along the East border was a
picket fence, and after the picket fence had
deteriorated there was a large barrier of granite stones and logs embedded on end to keep
vehicles out of the area. (R. 118)
5

( e) YVhere Brighton Road approaches the property, a gate had been placed and kept lockeu
for many years. Parts of the property Norti1
and East of Silver Lake were heavily wooded
which prevented access; and to the 'Vest and
South where the word "steep" is written it was
precipitious country where pasturing was not
possible. (R. 120)
( f) Access along a public road was controlled by
agate. (R.120)
( g) He has put up "no camping" and "private
property" signs and these have been replaced
from time to time. ( R. 121)
( h) There has been no mining activity on the prop·
erty. (R. 120, 121)
(i) The public has been permitted access by foot
for picnicing, fishing and other related activi·
ties, however, vehicular traffic has been kept
out. (R. 145). Barriers and this type of use of
the property has lasted up to the present time.
(R. 151). The nearest mines are more than
I,000 feet from the property and have not bee11
operated for over 50 years. (R. 147, 148, 151)

There is no testimony or evidence of any kind that ·
the defendants or any of their predecessors in title ever
had possession or use of the subject property.
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Payment Of Taxes On The Surface From 1946-1970
The County Assessor assessed the surface rights by
the metes and bounds description set forth in the above
mentioned Chain of Title, on the Assessment Rolls for
the years 1946 through 1949. (R. 130-132, Exs. 20-23)
and for the years 1950 through 1970. (R. 128, 129, Ex.
19-P)
Mr. James Moyle, the secretary of Lakewood
Farm, personally paid all of these taxes on behalf of
the Lakewood Farm Corporation. (R. 114-115). As
secretary of the Lakewood Farm, James D. Moyle testified that it was his signature affixed to the Warranty
Deed and the Correction 'Varranty Deed, (Ex. 7-P and
8-P), wherein the property was deeded to Wilford M.
Burton, Trustee. (R. 122, 123). In connection with the
transfer of the properties to the Lakewood Farm, the
original Deed from the Old Evergreen Mining and
Tunnel Company, (Ex. 5-P), was discovered in the old
files of James H. Moyle. (R. 136). The Deed had not
been recorded and was then delivered to Henry D.
Moyle, brother to James D. Moyle and son of James H.
Moyle, and the Deed was then recorded. (R. 137). At
this time he did observe the signatures of Henry D.
Moyle on the Lakewood Farm Deed and was present
when the acknowledgment was placed on the Deed. (R.
138)

Defendants'-Appellants' Interests
Any interest the defendants had in the Brighton
property was limited to the underground or mineral
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rights. A11y taxes paid by the defendants-appellant.I
were on the underground or mineral rights. The various
legal descriptions, tax notices and assessments as well as
any unrecorded contracts merely relate' to the underground rights or to interests expressly separated from
the subject surface interests. ( R. 7 4, 75, 76). The various instruments relating to the defendants'-appellants'
interests are as follows:
(a) Deed from Old Evergreen Mining and Tunnel
Company, dated December 31, 1929, (prior
deed of surface rights to Moyle was in 1911)
conveying the mining claims and signed by
Herbert Cohen, president, and Charles L.
Smith, secretary, in favor of Herbert Cohen
and John V. Lyle, vice-president, as trustees
in liquidation of the Old Evergreen Mining
and Tunnel Corporation. Said deed was re·
corded December 31, 1929. (Ex. 26-D, Ex.
48-P)
(b) Deed from the aforesaid Herbert Cohen and
John V. Lyle as trustees in liquidation to
Evergreen Mining Company conveying the
said lode mining claims listing said claims by
name, dated December 31, 1929, and recorded
on the same date.
( c)

' Tarranty Deed from Evergree11 Mining Com-

pany (the new corporation) to Gordon W.
Kirby and Finn Gurholt, dated July 23, 1954
and recorded July 30, 1954. Said Deed, how-
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ever, does not convey the Alton mining claim,
which comprises most of the property in the
lawsuit.
( d) An unrecorded real estate contract, (Ex. 29D) wherein the said Finn Gurholt and Gordon
Kirby agreed to sell to defendants certain mining claims, excepting therefrom in the second
paragraph of the description, the property subject of this lawsuit. (Ex. 29-D). Said real
estate contract thus excluded the surface
rights of the plaintiffs property.
(e) In connection with the above stated unrecorded real estate contract, an escrow was established at Security Title Company. (R. 204,
Ex. 47-P). All of the Deeds conveying into
and out of the escrow excluded the subject
property. (R. 205, Ex. 40-D). The escrow has
been closed and all Deeds have been executed
and there are no Deeds to the defendants.
(f) In said real estate contract, the purchasers',
Allstate Builders, Inc., Dale L. Jensen and
Eugene M. Openshaw all have disclaimed any
interest in the property. (R. 93, 94, 95). An
unrecorded Assignment dated August 10,
1965, assigns the interest of Dale Jensen and
Eugene M. Openshaw to Willard D. Rogers.
Said Assignment relates only to the said real
estate contract and thus excludes the properties subject of the plaintiffs' ownership. (R.
159)
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warded to the Tax Commission by the County
offices. (R. 199, 200)
ARGUMENT
There are three basic propositions:
(I) The surface rights were separated from the

underground rights in the very first Deed to James H.
Moyle in 1911, (Ex. 5-P) and were thus separately described and conveyed in an unbroken chain of title from
Mr. Moyle on down to the United States Government.
The defendants' claims on the other hand being initiated
subsequent to the Moyle family claims have been described in terms of the mining claims and underground
rights and whatever tax assessments, tax deeds or other
instruments that have been introduced have all shown
merely underground rights.
(2) The plaintiffs' possession and use of the property since the inception of title 50 years ago have been

for agricultural, recreational and non-mining activities.
Based upon this usage the assessment of taxes and payment of same has been properly initiated through the
County Assessor's office on the surface rights only.

(3) The defendants-appellants have no Chain of

Title which reaches them. The Gurholt-Kirby interests
were cut off by a Quiet Title action in 1963. Defendants-Appellants had no unrecorded interests. However,
· if they did they were only underground rights, and
never reached these defendants by either unrecorded or
11

( g) A Tax Deed (Ex. 32-D) together with the
au<litor·s Tax Deed and a description of property assessed was issued to Evergreen Miniug
Company, but no statutory
leading up to
the Deeds were shown. A Ta:: _Deed coveriug
East 1/2 of Alton mining claim (Ex. 34-D)
only covered mining rights and not the surface
rights, since the assessment and tax sale record
for 1962, the year ref erred to in the Tax Deed,
was clearly based upon a specific mining claim
assessment. (Ex. 46) . Such assessments are
made by the State Tax Commission and are
assessments of the mining activities. (R. 190,
191, Ex. 46-P, 1962 Assessment Roll, page 76
of mines)
(h) All Assessment Rolls and Tax Deeds (Ex.
43-D, Ex. 45) relate to the assessment and
payment of taxes on underground rights only.
All tax sale records for the underground rights
for the years 1958 through 1966 where surface
rights are mentioned, specifically exclude the
rights previously deeded to 'Vilford M. Bur·
ton, Trustee, in the following language: "less
tract deed to 'Vilford M. Burton, TR." (Ex.
46-P)
( i) ''There surf ace rights and underground rights
are separate, the surface rights are assessed by
the County Assessor and the underground
rights are assessed by the State Tax Commission, all based upon inf01mation which is for·
IO

recorded documents. The best that
be said for de.
fendants' claim, is the fact that they did file and record
a Notice of Interest in an attempt to cloud plaintiffs'
title. Until this Notice was filed in 1968 there are no
documents which even remotely indicate any claim to
surface rights in the Moyle property.
Respondents submit the following points in answer
to the correspondingly numbered points of the appellants' brief.

POINT I
RESPONDENTS ARE PROPER RECORD
TITLE HOLDERS HAVING OBTAINED
PROPER TITLE FROM LAKE,VOOD FARMS.
\Vilford Burton was properly authorized to take
under Section 57-2-2 Utah Code An·
notated wherein the requirements are set forth, and are
summarized as follows:
If the acknowledgment is within this State, then it
must be taken by a Judge, Clerk, Notary Public or Re·
corder; if acknowledged outside of the State then it
must be taken by a Judge, Clerk, Notary Public or
Commissioner; and if acknowledged outside of the
United States, by a Judge or Clerk of any Court in that
particular Country. Under paragraph 6 of said Section,
only the acknowledgment of a person known to the offi.
cer can be taken. Then paragraph 7 provides for the
form of the Certificate of Acknowledgment.
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Section 57-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, provides that
a document with the above required Certificate of Acknowledgment is entitled to be recorded. Paragraph 2
then states that this recordation gives notice, and paragraph 3 states that the failure to record shall render the
instrument void as to any subsequent purchaser in good
faith who first records his own conveyance. Our Court
has held that improper recordation does not destroy or
affect the validity of the conveyance as between the parties. Tarpey vs. Deseret Salt Company, 5 Utah 205, 14
Pac. 338.

Appellants contend that Wilford M. Burton is disqualified to take acknowledgment because of his interest
in the transaction, and by reason of this disqualification,
the Deed from Lakewood Farms to Wilford M. Burton, Trustee, is invalid and the title has stopped in Lakewood Farms. There is no substance for this claim to be
made under these statutes cited above. There is no disability set forth by reason of relationship of the officer
taking the acknowledgment or by reason of any interest
that he might conceivably have in the transaction. However, even if the trial court had found there was such a
disability which a trial court apparently can do, nevertheless these defendants have absolutely no standing to
take advantage thereof.
The defendants are in no way bona fide purchasers
taking subsequent to the Lakewood Farms conveyance,
nor have the defendants recorded any documents under
which they claim subsequent to that conveyance. Defendants' only claim is through an unrecorded real estate
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Court held that where the Grantee is merely a conduit
and has no beneficial interest, that acknowledgment is
not defective if taken by that Grantee as the acknowledging officer. Carroll v. National Live Stock Credit
Corporation, 286 F.2d 362, (C.A., 10th Cir.). Overto,n
v. Harband, 44 Pac.2d 484 6 Cal. Appel. 2d 465, wherein the Court stated that when the only effect of the acknowledgment is to impart notice, the disqualification
must appear on the face of the instrument. See also
Stockmans Nat. Bank v. Lukis, 33 P.2d 254 (Wyo.).
In our State the effect of the acknowledgment is only to
give form for recordation and does not affect the validity of the instrument. Clearly no defect appears on the
face of the instrument. The testimony clearly indicates
that Wilford Burton, Trustee, had no beneficial interest. (R. 124). Lankford v. First National Bank, 183
Pac. 56 (Okla.).
Admitting, arguendo, that the Deeds were not
properly recorded, that no title passed through Mr. Bur·
ton, that defendants' were bona fide purchasers and in
some way were entitled to assert the claim of invalidity,
nevertheless the title to the property through the dissolution vested in the United States of America by means of
the various conveyances from the corporate stockholders
in said dissolution. ( R. 219, Ex. 40-D, pages 55-60) .
POINT II
APPELLANTS HAVE NO CHAIN OF TITLE
TO THE SURF ACE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
15

contract executed in 1961. The only recorded docume 11 t
under which the defendants could conceivably claim is a
'Varranty Deed dated July 23, 1954<, and recorded July
30, 1954, wherein Mssrs. Kirby and Gurholt obtained
title to a portion of the underground from Evergreen
l\Iining Company. (Ex. 28-D). Such ·a conveyance,
however, is prior in time to the conveyance from Lakewood to Burton as Trustee.
However, notwithstanding the above, the appe].
lants' claim is without merit or substance as a factual
matter simply because Wilford Burton personally had
110 interest in the transaction, but in his capacity as
Trustee was a mere conduit of the title under the dissolution procedures whereby the Lakewood Farms Cor·
poration was conveying its property. In the escrow
agreement (Ex. 18-P) it is clear that Wilford M. Burton acts as Trustee to receive property in distribution
and in trust for the various beneficiaries and to convey
out. This he did. (R. 124)
Appellants cite two Utah cases, Norton v. Fuller,
and Crompton v. Jen sen. Neither of the above cases is in
point, since in each case the Notary Public had a direct
personal interest in the transaction. In the Norton case
he was the mortgagor and he also notarized his own sig·
nature. In the Crompton case the Notary acknowledged
the release of a mortgage on property while he was the
record title holder to the property; not as trustee, how·
ever. Both cases only hold that the mortgages were not
entitled to be recorded. In the case of
vs.
Schoul, 157 Atlantic 717, 161 Md. 425 (1931), the

14

Appellants claim that because the Deed to the
Trustee in dissolution of Old Evergreen Mining Com.
pany was recorded before the prior deed of the surface
rights to Mr. Moyle was recorded, that these trustees and
the new Evergreen lVlining Company have a completed
Chain of Title prior to the effective completion of the
Moyle Chain of Title. This argument is not sound for
two primary reasons :

1. The Grantees, Herbert Cohen and John V. Lyle
were merely trustees in liquidation of the Old Evergreen
Mining and Tunnel Company, and were
charged
with notice of the prior Deed made by the same company
when it conveyed the surface rights in the property to
Moyle. These two gentlemen as officers of the corporation conveyed to themselves as trustees for the corpo·
ration and thereafter as trustees in liquidation conveyed
to the new Evergreen Mining Company, which by the
very wording of the Deeds was set up to receive the
property which the trustees were holding in liquidation.
(Exs. 26-D, 27-D). Thus the knowledge of the prior '
conveyance by Old Evergreen Mining and Tunnel Com·
pany is imputed to the officers of the Old Evergreen
Mining and Tunnel Company, in turn to themselves as
trustees in liquidation and then to the new mining com·
pany which was set up in order to complete the trust
which had been imposed by the Old Evergreen Mining
Company. The two Deeds executed at the same time by
the same persons, recorded and acknowledged simul·
taniously clearly indicate that new Evergreen took only
that which Old Evergreen was able to convey and took
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subject to any notice of prior actiodti'f said Old Evergreen. Palmer v. Great Northern Railway Company,
170 Pac.2d, 768, 775, 119 Montana 68 (1946), Hays
Uyster v. Key Point Oyster Company, 391 Pac.2d 979,
U86, 64 \Vash.2d 37 5 ( 1964), Phillips v. Colfax Company, 243 Pac.2d 276, 282, 195 Oregon 285 (1952). See
also Stevens Company vs. First National Buildfng
Company, 89 Utah 456, 57 Pac.2d 1099, 1123 (1936).
2. Furthermore the Chain of Title claimed by appellants, if any, descends from Finn and Gurholt. These
two gentlemen did not receive any conveyance from
new Evergreen Mining Company until July, 1954, at
which time they recorded a Deed from Evergreen Mining Company. (Ex. 28-D). Even assuming that said
Deed perfected the Chain of Title of Kirby and Gurholt, nevertheless the Moyle Chain of Title was completed in 1944, IO years prior thereto when the Old
Evergreen Mining and Tunnel Company Deed was uncovered by James D. Moyle and recorded by Henry D.
Moyle, July 11, 1944. Thus Finn and Gurholt took title
in 1954 with full knowledge of the recorded Chain of
'l'itle from Old Evergreen Mining Company to J runes
Moyle and with full knowledge of the limitations in the
new Evergreen Deed.
Of course, thereafter in 1963 the Finn and Gurholt
title was eliminated in the quiet title action filed by '\Tilford M. Burton, Truestee. There still has been no recorded document subsequent thereto, evidencing title in
the present defendants.
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Appellants claim on page 8 of their brief that the
Tax Deed from Salt Lake County to Evergreen Mining
Company in 1936 for delinquent taxes for the years
1932.. 1936 (Ex. 32-D), in effect initiated a whole new
perfect title. This argument is without substance, and
would seem to be an attempt to lift one by ones own boot
straps.
Said Exhibit 32, which consisted of a Tax Deed
Auditor's Tax Deed and a description of property as-'
sessed, included none of the required statutory steps preceding a tax sale and thus there was no valid tax sale.
See section 59-10-6 UCA. Bolognese vs. Anderson, 87
Utah 450 and Bogievick vs. Slechta, 109 Utah 373. In
effect since the assessment was against Evergreen Min·
ing Company, since Evergreen failed to pay the tax,
and since it thereafter paid the tax and thus obtained a
Deed, it becomes nothing more than a redemption pro·
cedure. Evergreen could in no way be deemed to take
the property under such a Tax Deed as a bona fide pur·
chaser since it already had knowledge, when it obtained
the property in 1929, of the prior conveyance of surface
rights.
The appellants at page 9 of their brief cite a quota·
tion concerning the status of two Chains of Title, one of
which is completely recorded before the other is re·
corded. There are several reasons why the quotation is
of very little help to us. In the first place it is not taken
from the opinion itself, but is a note on the Zimmer
opinion and is preceded by another note to the effect
that there is very little authority upon this particular

18

c1uestion other than the Zimmer
,..The difference between Zimmer and our situation, is that the \Visconsin
statute provides that a Deed if not recorded is void,
whereas our statute provides that the Deed is valid between the parties. Secondly in the Zimmer case the
plaintiff purchased from a Grantor who had no recorded
title. In our case every purchase and transaction was
from a record title holder so no similar question is presented. Thirdly, as has been indicated, the trustees of
the Old .Mining Company were not bona fide purchasers and thus the new Mining Company being
conceived out of the dissolution was in the same position . .Finally there is one other distinction. The complete
recorded Chain of Title of the defendants Rogers, et al.
herein does not reach them. They merely claim under an
unrecorded real estate contract. On the other hand the
plaintiffs' -respondents' title in this matter has been completely recorded. And thus if the quotation did have any
possible meaning under our Utah statutes it would be of
no help to the appellants, defendants herein.
POINT III
KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEED TO MOYLE
FROM THE OLD EVERGREEN MINING
AND TUNNEL COMPANY IS CHARGEABLE
TO THE TRUSTEES (GRANTEES) AND
NE\V EVERGREEN MINING COMPANY.
Appellants argue that there is no showing of the
knowledge of the prior Moyle Deed and cite a quotation from American Jurisprudence 2d.
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Company. There is 110 question abowt notice nor is there
any concept that the new
Mining Company
was iu any way a bona fide purchaser.
Appellants' reference to
exceptions in the
Deed is quite immaterial since said exceptions in no way
relate to the property in question, but instead ref er to a
conveyance to the Old Evergreen Mining Company
from James H. Moyle conveying other properties. 'Ve
have no evidence or record of any such conveyance to
the Old Evergreen Mining Company by James H.
Moyle.
POINT IV
RESPONDENTS' PAYMENT OF TAXES
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The appellants challenge respondents' payment of
taxes from 1950 through 1960, claiming that by paying
taxes during 1955 and 1956 at an earlier hour or date
than did the respondents for those years, appellants interrupted the 10 years of continuous and timely payments.
Neither the evidence nor the law cited by appellants support this position for the following reasons.
Ex. 43-D upon which appellants rely has a tax
ledger with a serial number 40-645 covering years 1955,
1956, 1957 showing assessment in the name of Kirby and
Gurholt. At the top is a typed statement, "Old serial
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Of course respondents' argument is that the subse.
quent officers of Old Evergreen Mining and Turmel
Company are charged with knowledge of the prior cor.
porate actions. Palmer, supra and other authorities cited
above under Point II so hold. Subsequent knowledge is
chargeable as a matter of law from the very documents
themselves. It would be a strange concept indeed, if
every new set of corporate officers was freed from re·
sponsibility and know ledge of the prior actions of the
corporation.
The first Deed, (Ex. 5-P) was executed and is·
sued to James H. Moyle pursuant to a valid acknowledgment wherein it is clearly set forth that the action
was by authority of a resolution of the Board of Directors 9f the corporation. The Deed in 1929 signed by
Herbert Cohen, president, and Charles L. Smith, sec·
retary, was likewise properly acknowledged and exe· i
cuted by authority of a resolution of the Board of Di- [
rectors. Can it reasonably be said that the 1929 Board of :
Directors is not charged with the knowledge of the 1911
actions of the Board of Directors?
Furthermore the 1929 Deed was executed by
Cohen and Smith in favor of Cohen and Lyle, a vice·
president of the company, each of which was acting as a
trustee in liquidation to hold the property and to trans·
fer it to the (new) Evergreen Mining Company. The
Deed to the new Mining Company was made, executed
and delivered on the same date in full satisfaction and
discharge of the trust imposed by and recited in the con·
veyance from the Old Evergreen Mining and Tunnel
20
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nurnber None. Not previously assessed." This statement
on the assessment is obviously incorrect for the follow.
ing reasons :
(a) The property description should have included
a statement which is included under the same serial num.
her for the year beginning 1958 "less tract deeded to
Wilford .M. Burton, Tr." In the same Ex. 43 appear
the tax ledger and assessment sheet for that serial num.
her assessed to Kirby and Gurholt showing that quite
clearly the surface rights being assessed did not include
the property deeded to Wilford M. Burton. The above
quoted reservation appears thereafter in all of the tax
ledgers covering the Kirby claimed rights.

( b) Ou the other hand the tax serial number for the
Lakewood Farm or Moyle property begins in 1946 ;
(Exs. 20, 21, 22, 23 with serial numbers 19-290, (R. 130· I
132) . Then commencing with the year 1950 the ·serial
number is changed to 40-644 (Ex. 19-P). Thereafter
the property has a serial number from 1950 through
1959 of 40-644. Then for the years 1960 the serial num·
her for the Burton property is changed to 40-645 and
Continues under that number through 1969. (Ex. 19-P)

1

( c) The serial number for the Kirby interest
changes from 40-645 in 1960 to 40-645-1.
In view of the foregoing there is ample evidence to
determine as a matter of fact and law that the assess·
ment on the Kirby serial number pages for the years
1955 and 1956 was improper and could not properly
cover the Moyle property. The payment of taxes by
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anyone pursuant to that assessment would not aff cct the
payment. The proper assessment was made by
the County for the surface as describe! in the metes and
bounds description on the Moyle or Lakewood Farm
property, and the payment of those taxes being timely,
was valid. Thus the Court properly concluded that the
)loyles through Lakewood Farm have properly paid the
taxes 011 a timely basis from 1950 through 1960.
Appellants cite Railway v. I.N.V. Company for
the proposition that the first one to pay the taxes (when
there is a double payment) is the one given credit for
said payment in determining adverse possession. The
case does not stand for that proposition, but to the co11lrary holds that it is not the first person paying the tax
that gets the benefit, but rather the person paying the
tax which was properly assessed. In the Railway case
the state had assessed the property to the railroad and
the county had assessed the property to the resident
owner. The Court held that even though the state assessment was first, the county assessment was proper and
the resident was given the benefit of the payment of the
tax. Such should be the case here.
The Homeowners Loan Corporation case in no
way holds that the adverse possession claimant must be
the only one to pay the taxes. It instead holds that such
a claimant must pay all taxes validly and legally assessed. In fact respondents paid all of the taxes validly
assessed on the surf ace rights. Any duplicate payment,
if there was such, should not destroy the efficacy of the
respondents' payments.
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There is no evidence by appellants' as to who paid
the taxes. Ou the other hand, respondents· testimony
through James D. Moyle was clear in showing that h.e
personally had paid the taxes over these many years
either for his family or for the Lakewood Farms Corporation. (R. 114, 115)
Therefore the Trial Court was clearly justified in
finding as a fact that the respondents had properly,
timely and continuously paid the taxes from 1950
through 1960, including these two years in question, and
that the appellants had not paid taxes on the surface I
rights or if they had paid any taxes the payments were .
only made for underground rights.
POINT V
THE 1963 QUIET TITLE DECREE IS A BAR
TO APPELLANTS CLAIM.
On June, 1961, Finn and Gurholt entered into a
real estate contract (Ex. 29-D) with defendants. The 'i
contract was placed in escrow at Security Title (R·
204). Kirby and Gurholt on July IO, 1961, recorded
December 29, 1961, executed a 'V-arranty Deed to Security Title expressly nrcfoding the subject property.
(Ex. 39-D, page 45) The Decree Quieting Title against
Kirby and Gurholt was entered and recorded February
5, 1963. There is little doubt in that decree that Burton's I
title prevailed and Kirby and Gurholt were adjudged
not to have any title in the surface rights. Anyone taking
title subsequent thereto would have to take subject to
1

1
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ll1e effect of the Decree. Section 57-3-2 U.C.A. provides
that every
" ... Judgment, Order or Decree shall from the
time of fdmg same with the recorder, impart notice to all persons and ali shall be deemed to purchase and take notice."
Since the defendants claimed interest stems from
Gurholt and Kirby, since the unrecorded contract gave
no notice to Burton, Trustee, and since his "conveyance"
from Kirby and Gurholt was perfected and recorded before defendants had recorded any conveyance, Burton
takes free of any claim of defendants.
Even arguing that such is not the case and this real
estate contract is given the same status as an unrecorded
Deed then what interest of the defendants therein does
the evidence support? Absolutely none.
Perhaps, if, during the years 1962 through 1969,
there had been some Deed to the defendants executed
and recorded, then the Kartchner case or our recording
statute would give appellants some help.
However, the escrow was closed and all Deeds were
issued by Security Title to other Grantees but no Deed,
conyeyance or document of any kind was executed and
recorded in favor of defendants. (R. 205, Ex. 39, 40,
H-D). In fact no Deeds for benefit of defendants were
erer executed by Kirby and Gurholt to Security Title.
Thus there is absolutely no evidence that def endants have any interest in the property. The Court was
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certainly justified in finding that the defendants had 110
interest and were barred by the 1963 Decree (R. 75)

POINT VI
APPELLANTS HA YE NO YALID CHAIN OF
TITLE.

Again we must emphasize that respondents' title is
to the surface rights and that the various documents
under which appellants claim relate only to the under·
ground rights upon this property.

Appellants however claim that the Tax Deed in
1936 is the origin of a valid tax title which together with
subsequent payment of taxes for 10 years strengthens
into a full legal title overriding all legal and possessory
interests of the respondents. The Trial Court has prop· 1
erly found that such is not the case.
Said Tax Deed is deficient on its face because the
Auditor's Deed only relates to the one year of 1931,
whereas the Deed of the County attempts to pass title
for tax sales for years of 1931 through 1935.

1

Additionally, however, an examination of the prop·
erty description when compared to the description in the
Yarious documents for 1939 through 1954< in Ex. 43-D
shows that these descriptions and the corresponding
assessments are by the State Tax Commission for Mines.
Furthermore, said assessments are only for $5.00 an
acre and in the applicable columns on the Assessment ,
Rolls show no assessment for surface rights, but do show ,

26

a)scssment for mining rights. The subject Deed is del1cieut because there is not shown for the years 1931
through 1935 just what was assessed. In other words we
hare no proof that it is the surface rights rather than the
underground rights which were subject of the alleged
deficiency. Thus Ex. 32-D is defective. This problem is
tliscussed in more detail under Point IV above.

POINT VII

THE COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT RESPONDENTS HELD TITLE BY

ADrERSE POSSESSION.

1

The question of payment of seven years taxes has
already been discussed above and therefore the essence
of appellants' point VII relates to the basis for separate
assessment of the surf ace and underground rights and
the sufficiency of the evidence to show possession and
occupancy of the premises.
On page 18 appellants contend that up to 1936 all
assessments would be made by the Tax Commission on
both surface and subsurface rights combined. There is
no such evidence in the record to support this supposition.

Contrary to appellants' statement the 1936 tax sale
rlid not include both surf ace and subsurface rights. Once
again if appellants were claiming this to be the case, then
r"1·iclence should have been submitted by way of the
1arious assessment rolls to so indicate.
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a11<l the State were properly making the separate assess-

rneuts, i.e. the surf ace to the Moyles and the underground to the Kirby and Gurholt or Evergreen Mining
Company interests. Thus the appellants' elaborate chart
wliich collcludes that most of the assessments are invalid
has very little efficacy in our case. The chart on page 19
of appellants' brief would lead one to believe that there
was double taxation all the way down through the various years and that all of the County assessments were
invalid and all of the Tax Commission assessments were
rnlid. The chart is misleading and is not in accordance
with the documents of record and certainly is contrary
to the statute and to the procedures of the Utah State
Tax Commission.
At page 20 of appellants' brief appellant claims
that respondent has only paid two years of taxes and
that all other assessments since 1946 have been invalid.
As an example of the unrealistic reasoning appellants
cite Exhibit 45 as evidence of the fact that the 1958 Tax
Deed (Ex. 45-P) was a conveyance of both underground and surface rights. Such is patently not the
case. I quote from the last sentence of the property description. "Underground rights only." Furthermore if
one refers to the 1953 assessment included in Exhibit 43
it is explicitly clear that the assessment was for mines,
was made by the State Tax Commission, was for $35.09,
\\'as not for surface rights, and was for underground
rights. Once again this points up the disregard the appellants have for the record documents in this case.
Carryinrr
the same Assessment Rolls back to 1939, it is
•
b
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Appellants then conclude that there would be no
reason for separate assessments from 1936 01i. This cou.
cept is erroneous simply because beginning in 1941
when the Deed to l\Ioyle was recorded, there then was as
a matter of record
of the surface and the
underground rights. But, as early as 1939, the assess.
ment records which we do have (Ex. 4<3-D) show clear·
ly assessment at $5.00 an acre on mine and mining claims
but not on surface rights.
Howeyer, appellants' theory that the State Tax
Commission looks at the record title to determine
whether or not it should make an assessment, is con·
trary to the statutes. As Mr. Cooper from the Utah State
Tax Commission testified that the procedure followed
was in accordance with Section 59-5-57 U.C.A. (R
200). He further indicates that he gets information pri·
marily from the County Recorder's office and from that
a file is made and information is then requested from the
owner as to the nature of the mining activity.
Section 59-5-57 U.C.A. provides in effect that
where the surface of the land is owned by one person
and the mineral underlying the land is owned by an·
other, the property rights shall be separately assessed to
the respective owners in such cases.
"The value of the surface if it is used for other
than mining purposes shall be assessed by th.e
Assessor of the County in which the property 11
situate."

It is quite clear therefore that at least beginning in
1939 where there is separate ownership that the County
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rcrse to any claimed possession which appellants seem
to assert for Evergreen.
POINT VIII

THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT DOES NOT
COVER THE LAND IN QUESTION.
The real estate contract quite clearly describes a
portion of the mining claims involved in the area and
dearly excepts "therefrom the following described portions thereof," describing the Moyle property in the
exact description set out in all of the Moyle Deeds, Tax
documents and the 1963 Quiet Title Decree. That description is the second paragraph in the description on
the first page of the contract.
On the second page of the contract the agreement
provides that the Sellers will sell different portions of
the mining claims by Quit Claim Deed, but then quite
dearly incorporates in this description the exceptions
which have been spelled out above. Of course the pertinent wording is "as excepted hereinabove." There are
no other exceptions above except those exceptions
named on the first page, which of course include our
subject property.
If there was any doubt in that language, the actions
of the parties have quite clearly interpreted the contract
just as we interpret it here. The only Deeds from Kirby
and Gurholt to Security Title Company under this contract to be put in escrow is a Deed which expressly re-
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clear that the same description and the same assessment<
were made by the State Tax Commission for under.
ground rights and not for surface rights. For appellant,
to claim that this was an assessment of surface
inconceivable.
Appellants then recite a portion of the testimonyul
Mr. James D. Moyle. Quite obvious in its omission an
the references to more recent use of the property for
recreational purposes and the more recent errection 0;
signs, gates and stones as well as upended logs to limit
access to the property. ( R. 116, 117, 118, 121, 145 anc
151). The evidence in testimony is more than ample to
sustain the Lower Court's finding that the property has
been occupied and has been in possession of the Moyle
family over the entire 50 year period right up to the
filing of the lawsuit. It is true the useage changed from
agricultural to recreational. Nevertheless the
was controlled, it was improved, the public was regu·
lated by signs and gates. There is no evidence to the con·
trary.
Appellants finally claim on page 25 that the Ever·
green Mining Company purchased the land in 1936 ano
then they became fee owners and as such were possesseo
of it and this possession was never attacked, disturbed or
adversed. The purchase in 1936 was by the Tax Deed
the validity of which is certainly in question as we hart
outlined above. Furthermore the Tax Deed was
for the mineral rights and not for the surface rights, bu!
I suppose more importantly under this particular point
the Moyles have been in possession of the property ad·
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ser;·e_s and excepts therefrom the )loyle property, de r
scnbmg the Moyle property in the exact language o:
the second paragraph in the contract. (Ex. 39-D, pagi u
45). There have been 110 other Deeds by Gurholt
c
Kirby to the escrow in an attempt to convey the reserveJ
land nor have there been any Deeds from the escrow11
the purchasers attempting to convey the land. Ther1
have been no Deeds from Gurholt and Kirby directly 1
the purchasers attempting to convey the reserved Jane
and the escrow has now been closed since 1965.
What better proof cau there be of the intent of tlii
parties than the parties' actions all undertaken befon
they learned that the .Moyles were selling the land to th1
United States Government. It was only until 1968 tha1
any interest was indicated by these defendants. At tha
time a Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in ar'
obvious attempt to cloud the title to the property. (Ex
39-D, page 64). Even at that point the Notice of Inter·
est was so indefinite as to be no notice at all. It claim
under "certain unrecorded instruments and documents.

1
•

Can there be any doubt therefore, but that the con·
tract was never intended to convey to these people or 11
grant to these people, who are defendants herein, an!
interest in the Moyle property.

SUMMARY
The respondents established a legal chain of tilir
from the patent to the present owners. During this Jlf
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riod of ownership respondents through the Moyle f amily and Lakewood Farms have been in possession thereof. paying the taxes since 1946. The defendants have

established no interest in the property-no chain of
title, no possession and no payment of taxes.
The Trial Court should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Clyde, Mecham and Pratt
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